Showing posts with label law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label law. Show all posts

Tuesday, September 17, 2013

Part II: Rules, of Rules, Religion, and Free Will--and Cognitive Science

Rules
Having started with free will, next let's look at rules, positioning rules as the opposite of free will, as if to say, if there are rules and I can't do anything I want to do, that means somebody is trying to intrude on my free will.

I'm going to spend considerable time on rules, given their importance in everyday life, in religion--in fact, you could say, in the whole scheme of things--as well as to the thesis I'm developing.

In America, rules don't come to mind initially as something we praise.  We see rules as confining, as an impediment to freedom, as something to be overcome. Can that view of rules be unrelated to the prototypical American ethos--individualistic, independent, anti-authoritarian?

Anti-authoritarianism is as American as apple pie.  Yet there is also a familiar Christian subtext to the objection to rules.  It is not for nothing that there is "protest" in "Protestant."

Let's look at that etymology a little further.  It's worth noting that protest comes to us through Middle English and Old French from the Latin pro-testari, to testify before or publicly testify--to declare--retained in statements such as "He protested his innocence," or "He protested his love for her."  In Shakespeare's day, to protest in the sense of to proclaim wasn't limited to abstractions such as protesting one's sentiments; Shakespeare could speak of "Unrough youths who even now/Protest their first manhood" (dictionary example).

So it may be that imagining the verb protest to have meant, for Martin Luther, "to strongly object," is to read back into the past what it has come to mean today.  Scholar John Madden, in a lecture on the Reformation (Odyssey of the West IV--Toward Enlightenment, Modern Scholar), says Luther did not defiantly hammer his 95 theses to the church door as we visualize the scene now; he merely tacked up the subject of his forthcoming lecture.  In other words, the way he got angry was the way university professors still get angry: they put it into a lecture.

It's also noteworthy that, according to Wictionary, the transitive usage by which we say, "I protest the results of the election," or, "I protest the building of a shopping center in this residential neighborhood," is chiefly North American.

Nevertheless, whatever the spirit in which Luther posted his theses in 1517, Protestants today usually picture themselves as having stood up to unjust authority, including declaring their freedom from Catholic "dogma" (rules).

From my vantage point as a Jew, I have often thought I could pick out a central tension within Christianity.  Jesus vs. Church, rebellion vs. authority.  As soon as anything gets established, there are rules; those who disagree with the rules (and there are always some who disagree) condemn the rules in the name of following Jesus, tarring the objectionable religious establishment as rule-bound and authoritarian.

A. N. Wilson, writing in Paul: The Mind of the Apostle, parses that tension in terms of Paul and Jesus, with, in his rendition, Paul representing established political authority--the conservative end of the spectrum--and Jesus representing liberalism, or sometimes even theocracy-based anarchism and revolution:

...The Paul/Jesus dichotomy is never more sharply shown than in its political implications; nor is it a Catholic/Protestant divide.  On the whole, the more Paulist the Christian, the more likely to support the political status quo: Luther shored up the German princes and Cranmer baptised not merely the Tudor realpolitik but the English idea of themselves as an independent entity at the birth of the nation state in Europe.  Ignatius, by contrast, served a theocracy of which he believed Jesus to be king, and saw nothing wrong with undermining and spying against sovereign states.  Paul would have been amazed by the idea of Jesuits; Simon the Zealot would have understood them.  The United States was founded by Protestant Jesus-worshippers....

Back in 1950s and '60s America, and still sometimes detectable, there was a notion that Protestantism vs. Catholicism was the crucial issue; as we just saw, A. N. Wilson says not.

In a Christian context these days, I more often hear of "rules" in terms of Judaism and what "the Jewish leaders" did.

In that Christianity vs. Judaism narrative, rules can function as the opposite of Christianity--rules, accordingly, becoming something "the Jews" followed but Jesus didn't, something the "Jewish leaders" imposed but that he overthrew, rules being what Paul even calls (according to some traditional readings) the veritable cause of sin.  As a result of the language of the Gospels and the Epistles and of later theology, there is a wealth of Christian suspicion of rules and "law."  That is a notion that frequently surfaces.

Please note that the Christian habit of seeing "rules" as "Jewish" in a pejorative sense says more about Christianity than it does about Judaism.

In other words, it's part of Christianity's picture of Judaism and the general usage of Judaism as a foil for Christianity, for the purpose of saying this ("we"--that is, Christianity) is good, while that ("they"--Judaism), is bad, so join up with us and repudiate them.

By extension, since "we" (here, Christians) have now declared "them" (Jews) bad, their rules, by definition, are bad, too--meaningless regulations for the purpose of "holding people down," or whatever "we" (Christians) perceive as the opposite of what "we" are about.

What I have just described is a polemic: a common type of argument that, unlike debate, aims to establish the truth of one position and the falsity of the opposing position, between which there is no middle ground.  In a polemic, the opposing position is caricatured for ease of demolishing it.

Those accused of holding the opposing position then are conveniently available for use as a "common enemy," which works like this:  A common enemy functions to paper over all troubling internal disagreement.  By means of the common enemy a group outsources all disruptive conflict.  The group makes some person or segment the scapegoat and pins everything on them.   By that sleight of hand, those "others" are now the outsiders, the troublemakers, the divisive ones, the cause of all difficulties, and the deserving focus of ire by an ingroup now purified and united against--the common enemy.

Here I'm claiming that, just as the issue of rules is not an issue of Protestantism vs. Catholicism, neither, in fact, is it one of Christianity vs. Judaism, certain familiar habits of thinking notwithstanding.

Theologically speaking, Judaism cannot be reduced to rules, regulations, and the established order.  To take one example: While on one hand, the creation story may capture the pole of bringing order out of chaos, on the other hand, the calling down of messy plagues on Pharaoh reflects the opposite.

Nor is lawlessness an accurate portrayal of Christianity.

Last summer (2012) I was a guest at a Sunday School class during which someone brought up rules in the familiar light--as though they were something Jewish that Jesus was against--but the Sunday school teacher, who happened to be a seminary faculty member, said, no, that was incorrect.  The tension over rules--what, how much, and how many--was a tension within Christianity, not between Christianity and Judaism, she said.

Be that as it may, the Christian habit of thinking about rules as meaning Judaism is so common and deeply entrenched that "rules," if one is a Christian, is something of a codeword.  Just say "rules" in a certain tone, and everybody knows what's meant.  It's like the old saw about the people who know each other so well, they just say "Joke Number 17" and everybody laughs.

Rules as representing the difference between Christianity and Judaism, or as evidence that Christianity is a better religion, may be one that is neither official nor theologically justified, but nevertheless seems to be understood that way in the hearts and minds of many Christians.

One example comes from the 2006 book The Faith Club, about a trio of women, one Jewish, one Muslim, and one Christian, learning from each other.  The Christian woman of the trio said that prior to her transformative experience with her two friends, she used to teach in Sunday school that Jesus' proclamation of to love God with all one's heart, soul, mind, and strength and one's neighbor as oneself as the greatest commandment was a "radical departure" from the "don't do this" rules of the Old Testament.  As the result of her interfaith experience, she came to understand her old view as wrong.  Jesus was not opposed to his Judaism but was building on it.

A sermon I heard several years ago provides another example of the way Christians so often think of rules and Judaism.   Criticizing the behavior of Jews as portrayed in the New Testament, the pastor capped his sermon with, "Sometimes you have to do something beside just follow rules."

I'm not saying that preacher didn't know better, but, if he did, he couldn't or didn't stand up to what his congregation expected to hear.

Although that particular sermon was preached at a very politically liberal church, opinions about rules may not be so very different on the conservative side. A Christmas Day opinion piece several years ago by the local paper's conservative columnist proclaimed that "Christianity is news; other religions are advice."

That view of Judaism by Christians--that it is (just) rules--is close to the one my own Christian husband held before we began studying together.   Although his belief that Judaism was an ethical system revealed itself in more benign language, the implication was that Christianity, in contrast, was a religion.  It was not something he had thought about or questioned; it was just an assumption that came with the territory.

Of course, before we began studying, I myself was largely clueless, neither knowing much about Judaism nor being clearly aware that many Americans look down on it as consisting of only rules, ethics, or advice.

The emphasis on "advice" can reflect, I think, an attempt to get around the issue of rules by implying that Christian rules, such as they are, do involve ethics--that is, right and wrong--while the more distasteful sort of rules "just tell people what to do" or say "do this, don't do that."

One need only think of rules for young children, which concern safety, not ethics, to see the limits of that dichotomy.  (Sometimes it's quite hard to say whether a rule is for safety or for right and wrong; think about it.) Or, consider advising people to come to church regularly.  Don't sleep in on Sundays, or how to dress for church: advice! 

Nor is it an issue of telling people what to do vs. what not to do, a rationalization preferred by some.

Yet those sorts of rationalizations are in common parlance.  Their purpose is to make logical-sounding the polemic about Judaism being a religion of rigid rules and regulations while Christianity is one of spiritual freedom--part of the narrative built into Christianity at the foundational level.

The very focus on freedom vs. rules that has functioned to outsource conflict and establish boundaries has also served to exacerbate the tension between authority and freedom within Christianity, so that the fact that some people, some of the time and in significant numbers, are thinking that freedom is the opposite of rules, is sufficient to sow dissension and disunity.

All of the above feeds into our heightened American fixation on individualism, free choice, free will, and freedom from rules.

As I have mentioned, that ethos affects not only certain segments of the population (that is, not only Christians, and not only Protestants) but all of us.  The culture in which we live permeates all of us.

Having made the foregoing foray into the territory of religion, we're going to step away from religion in the next section and turn to science.  The next section focuses on the new cognitive psychological science and what it has to do with free will and rules.

(The reader may click here to view Parts I - IV in one continuous post, or here to go to Part III.)

Monday, September 16, 2013

Rules, Religion and Free Will, In Light of Today's Cognitive Science


I'm publishing a version of what follows in four shorter posts, Parts I - IV, as well as the present extended version.  Link to the stand-alone Part I (Free Will)

Free Will
The concept of free will is foundational to the American ethos of the rugged individualist, who, purged through wilderness survival of ancient religious and political corruption by power, lives out an egalitarian and de-theologized Protestant ethic.

I was confronted with that notion in this book review (of The Last of the Mohicans), although I take full responsibility for my interpretation and thought processes.

Even though the ethos of which I'm speaking has roots in American Protestantism, it also has resonance for other traditions.  But at first the bulk of immigrants consisted of Protestants, giving them the first crack at what the American ethos would be.

That rugged-individualist aspect of the American ethos, forged in the era of Manifest Destiny, was subject to the prejudices as well as the heroics of the time.  The odds to be fought and difficulties to be overcome included prevailing over Native Americans.  That particular narrative of history and character has come under revisionist challenge, yet I dare say is unofficially alive and well in the hearts of many--not only those who would defiantly champion it but also those who would abjure it.  It lingers not so far under the surface in assumptions about the national character, for example, in our detective fiction, on which Adam Gopnik has a fascinating piece in The New Yorker's 2013 Summer Fiction Issue.  

A case in point: Charles Seabrook, author of the "Wild Georgia" column for The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, wrote the following in his June 29, 2013 column on how the national parks protect our cultural heritage:

Mystery writer Nevada Barr, a former park ranger whose novels are set in national parks, sums up in Sierra Club Magazine the feelings of many park lovers: “Our (national) parks are the home of our wildness, our pioneer spirit. Seeing them we know we can do much, go far, withstand the harshest punishment. We know we can make it; we can survive and thrive and flourish.”

With a foundational narrative rooted in heroic individualism, no wonder the great majority of Americans went ballistic regarding New York Mayor Bloomberg's anti-supersize soda initiative.  The phenomenon certainly wasn't limited to Protestants.  The uproar also cut across the liberal-conservative divide, uniting almost everybody in opposition to Bloomberg's perceived tampering with our free will.

Self-discipline in our culture is usually seen in terms of free will; that is, using one's own will power to do what is right and avoid doing wrong.

Free will is experienced as voluntary choice made within the realm of one's own awareness or consciousness.  The Web definition of free will is: "the power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate; the ability to act at one's own discretion."  As an adjective, the definition is: "given readily, voluntary: 'free-will offerings.'"  Mirriam-Webster Online says: "Voluntary choice or decision; 'I do this of my own free will,'" and "freedom of humans to make choices that are not determined by prior causes or by divine intervention."

Now that I've looked a little at free will, the upcoming section will focus on rules, and on how we think of rules in relation to free will.
 
Rules
Having started with free will, next let's look at rules, positioning rules as the opposite of free will, as if to say, if there are rules and I can't do anything I want to do, that means somebody is trying to intrude on my free will.

I'm going to spend considerable time on rules, given their importance in everyday life, in religion--in fact, you could say, in the whole scheme of things--as well as to the thesis I'm developing.

In America, rules don't come to mind initially as something we praise.  We see rules as confining, as an impediment to freedom, as something to be overcome. Can that view of rules be unrelated to the prototypical American ethos--individualistic, independent, anti-authoritarian?

Anti-authoritarianism is as American as apple pie.  Yet there is also a familiar Christian subtext to the objection to rules.  It is not for nothing that there is "protest" in "Protestant."

Let's look at that etymology a little further.  It's worth noting that protest comes to us through Middle English and Old French from the Latin pro-testari, to testify before or publicly testify--to declare--retained in statements such as "He protested his innocence," or "He protested his love for her."  In Shakespeare's day, to protest in the sense of to proclaim wasn't limited to abstractions such as protesting one's sentiments; Shakespeare could speak of "Unrough youths who even now/Protest their first manhood" (dictionary example).

So it may be that imagining the verb protest to have meant, for Martin Luther, "to strongly object," is to read back into the past what it has come to mean today.  Scholar John Madden, in a lecture on the Reformation (Odyssey of the West IV--Toward Enlightenment, Modern Scholar), says Luther did not defiantly hammer his 95 theses to the church door as we visualize the scene now; he merely tacked up the subject of his forthcoming lecture.  In other words, the way he got angry was the way university professors still get angry: they put it into a lecture.

It's also noteworthy that, according to Wictionary, the transitive usage by which we say, "I protest the results of the election," or, "I protest the building of a shopping center in this residential neighborhood," is chiefly North American.

Nevertheless, whatever the spirit in which Luther posted his theses in 1517, Protestants today usually picture themselves as having stood up to unjust authority, including declaring their freedom from Catholic "dogma" (rules).

From my vantage point as a Jew, I have often thought I could pick out a central tension within Christianity.  Jesus vs. Church, rebellion vs. authority.  As soon as anything gets established, there are rules; those who disagree with the rules (and there are always some who disagree) condemn the rules in the name of following Jesus, tarring the objectionable religious establishment as rule-bound and authoritarian.

A. N. Wilson, writing in Paul: The Mind of the Apostle, parses that tension in terms of Paul and Jesus, with, in his rendition, Paul representing established political authority--the conservative end of the spectrum--and Jesus representing liberalism, or sometimes even theocracy-based anarchism and revolution:

...The Paul/Jesus dichotomy is never more sharply shown than in its political implications; nor is it a Catholic/Protestant divide.  On the whole, the more Paulist the Christian, the more likely to support the political status quo: Luther shored up the German princes and Cranmer baptised not merely the Tudor realpolitik but the English idea of themselves as an independent entity at the birth of the nation state in Europe.  Ignatius, by contrast, served a theocracy of which he believed Jesus to be king, and saw nothing wrong with undermining and spying against sovereign states.  Paul would have been amazed by the idea of Jesuits; Simon the Zealot would have understood them.  The United States was founded by Protestant Jesus-worshippers....

Back in 1950s and '60s America, and still sometimes detectable, there was a notion that Protestantism vs. Catholicism was the crucial issue; as we just saw, A. N. Wilson says not.

In a Christian context these days, I more often hear of "rules" in terms of Judaism and what "the Jewish leaders" did.

In that Christianity vs. Judaism narrative, rules can function as the opposite of Christianity--rules, accordingly, becoming something "the Jews" followed but Jesus didn't, something the "Jewish leaders" imposed but that he overthrew, rules being what Paul even calls (according to some traditional readings) the veritable cause of sin.  As a result of the language of the Gospels and the Epistles and of later theology, there is a wealth of Christian suspicion of rules and "law."  That is a notion that frequently surfaces.

Please note that the Christian habit of seeing "rules" as "Jewish" in a pejorative sense says more about Christianity than it does about Judaism.

In other words, it's part of Christianity's picture of Judaism and the general usage of Judaism as a foil for Christianity, for the purpose of saying this ("we"--that is, Christianity) is good, while that ("they"--Judaism), is bad, so join up with us and repudiate them.

By extension, since "we" (here, Christians) have now declared "them" (Jews) bad, their rules, by definition, are bad, too--meaningless regulations for the purpose of "holding people down," or whatever "we" (Christians) perceive as the opposite of what "we" are about.

What I have just described is a polemic: a common type of argument that, unlike debate, aims to establish the truth of one position and the falsity of the opposing position, between which there is no middle ground.  In a polemic, the opposing position is caricatured for ease of demolishing it.

Those accused of holding the opposing position then are conveniently available for use as a "common enemy," which works like this:  A common enemy functions to paper over all troubling internal disagreement.  By means of the common enemy a group outsources all disruptive conflict.  The group makes some person or segment the scapegoat and pins everything on them.   By that sleight of hand, those "others" are now the outsiders, the troublemakers, the divisive ones, the cause of all difficulties, and the deserving focus of ire by an ingroup now purified and united against--the common enemy.

Here I'm claiming that, just as the issue of rules is not an issue of Protestantism vs. Catholicism, neither, in fact, is it one of Christianity vs. Judaism, certain familiar habits of thinking notwithstanding.

Theologically speaking, Judaism cannot be reduced to rules, regulations, and the established order.  To take one example: While on one hand, the creation story may capture the pole of bringing order out of chaos, on the other hand, the calling down of messy plagues on Pharaoh reflects the opposite.

Nor is lawlessness an accurate portrayal of Christianity.

Last summer (2012) I was a guest at a Sunday School class during which someone brought up rules in the familiar light--as though they were something Jewish that Jesus was against--but the Sunday school teacher, who happened to be a seminary faculty member, said, no, that was incorrect.  The tension over rules--what, how much, and how many--was a tension within Christianity, not between Christianity and Judaism, she said.

Be that as it may, the Christian habit of thinking about rules as meaning Judaism is so common and deeply entrenched that "rules," if one is a Christian, is something of a codeword.  Just say "rules" in a certain tone, and everybody knows what's meant.  It's like the old saw about the people who know each other so well, they just say "Joke Number 17" and everybody laughs.

Rules as representing the difference between Christianity and Judaism, or as evidence that Christianity is a better religion, may be one that is neither official nor theologically justified, but nevertheless seems to be understood that way in the hearts and minds of many Christians.

One example comes from the 2006 book The Faith Club, about a trio of women, one Jewish, one Muslim, and one Christian, learning from each other.  The Christian woman of the trio said that prior to her transformative experience with her two friends, she used to teach in Sunday school that Jesus' proclamation of to love God with all one's heart, soul, mind, and strength and one's neighbor as oneself as the greatest commandment was a "radical departure" from the "don't do this" rules of the Old Testament.  As the result of her interfaith experience, she came to understand her old view as wrong.  Jesus was not opposed to his Judaism but was building on it.

A sermon I heard several years ago provides another example of the way Christians so often think of rules and Judaism.   Criticizing the behavior of Jews as portrayed in the New Testament, the pastor capped his sermon with, "Sometimes you have to do something beside just follow rules."

I'm not saying that preacher didn't know better, but, if he did, he couldn't or didn't stand up to what his congregation expected to hear.

Although that particular sermon was preached at a very politically liberal church, opinions about rules may not be so very different on the conservative side. A Christmas Day opinion piece several years ago by the local paper's conservative columnist proclaimed that "Christianity is news; other religions are advice."

That view of Judaism by Christians--that it is (just) rules--is close to the one my own Christian husband held before we began studying together.   Although his belief that Judaism was an ethical system revealed itself in more benign language, the implication was that Christianity, in contrast, was a religion.  It was not something he had thought about or questioned; it was just an assumption that came with the territory.

Of course, before we began studying, I myself was largely clueless, neither knowing much about Judaism nor being clearly aware that many Americans look down on it as consisting of only rules, ethics, or advice.

The emphasis on "advice" can reflect, I think, an attempt to get around the issue of rules by implying that Christian rules, such as they are, do involve ethics--that is, right and wrong--while the more distasteful sort of rules "just tell people what to do" or say "do this, don't do that."

One need only think of rules for young children, which concern safety, not ethics, to see the limits of that dichotomy.  (Sometimes it's quite hard to say whether a rule is for safety or for right and wrong; think about it.) Or, consider advising people to come to church regularly.  Don't sleep in on Sundays, or how to dress for church: advice! 

Nor is it an issue of telling people what to do vs. what not to do, a rationalization preferred by some.

Yet those sorts of rationalizations are in common parlance.  Their purpose is to make logical-sounding the polemic about Judaism being a religion of rigid rules and regulations while Christianity is one of spiritual freedom--part of the narrative built into Christianity at the foundational level.

The very focus on freedom vs. rules that has functioned to outsource conflict and establish boundaries has also served to exacerbate the tension between authority and freedom within Christianity, so that the fact that some people, some of the time and in significant numbers, are thinking that freedom is the opposite of rules, is sufficient to sow dissension and disunity.

All of the above feeds into our heightened American fixation on individualism, free choice, free will, and freedom from rules.

As I have mentioned, that ethos affects not only certain segments of the population (that is, not only Christians, and not only Protestants) but all of us.  The culture in which we live permeates all of us.

Having made the foregoing foray into the territory of religion, we're going to step away from religion in the next section and turn to science.  The next section focuses on the new cognitive psychological science and what it has to do with free will and rules.

Science
We've talked first about free will, and then about rules as a perceived impediment to free will.  Now we need to take a look at the new cognitive science as it pertains to free will as usually conceived: the ability to make unconstrained choices.

What does science, specifically, cognitive psychology, but also anthropology, neuroscience, and even experimental philosophy, have to do with that ability to make unconstrained choices?

At first blush science seems to pose a challenge to free will in the ordinary sense, since it has shown we are profoundly but subtly influenced on an ongoing basis by our surroundings.  The source of that influence is said to be evolutionary, that is, our minds are programmed to respond interactively to our environments so that we might process oncoming floods of data rapidly enough to make judgments that enhance our survival. One example of a scientist working in that vein is Daniel Kahneman, who, in his 2011 bestseller Thinking, Fast and Slow, breaks down how it works.

Kahneman designates fast and intuitive mental responses as "System 1," while calling slow and deliberative mental processing "System 2."  System 1 includes both automatic responses and overlearned responses.  For example, an illusion in which one line looks longer than another depending on the angle at which fin-like lines are attached (the Müller-Lyer illusion) is an example of a relatively automatic response, while the seemingly instantaneous decisions of an emergency room physician or a chess master are examples of the effect of expert learning.  Kahneman makes the point that expert decisions are rapid because they are based on overlearning and practice, even though we may call them "intuitive" decisions.

Many of our rapid-fire habitual responses started out as slow.  Take reading.  Think back to what reading was like at age five or six.  If that's difficult to remember, picture a child learning to read.  Now that we have practiced and honed the skill of literacy over the years, just think what our brains and minds do for us in the area of reading!  Perhaps you've seen those examples of how easily we can read despite multiple errors and omissions.  For another example, think of learning to drive, juxtaposed against your current level of skill.  Through discipline and practice, what began as System 2 is now largely in the realm of System 1.  Reading and driving are two examples of areas in which, once beginners but now experts, we make rapid-fire, "intuitive" responses.

While Systems 1 and 2 have no objective existence, they are useful descriptive devices.  Here is some of what Kahneman has to say about them:

When we think of ourselves, we identify with System 2, the conscious, reasoning self that has beliefs, makes choices, and decides what to think about and what to do.  Although System 2 believes itself to be where the action is, the automatic System 1 is the hero of the book (Thinking, Fast and Slow).  I describe System 1 as effortlessly originating impressions and feelings that are the main sources of the explicit beliefs and deliberate choices of system 2....

...We are born prepared to perceive the world around us, recognize objects, orient attention, avoid losses, and fear spiders.  Other mental activities have become fast and automatic through prolonged practice....

Our actions run the gamut from completely involuntary to those subject to apparent voluntary control; System 2 behaviors are characterized by their need for our attention and are disrupted without it.  As for attention, we have a limited amount of it and have to allocate it.  When we're spending it somewhere we do not have it for somewhere else; to demonstrate that phenomenon Kahneman uses this apt example.

Next, we need to look at Kahneman's discussion of priming, to show how it's a problem for what we consider to be free will.  An example of priming that we are all familiar with is the notion of going to the grocery store when hungry, then purchasing more and other than we intended.

But priming goes much further than that.  It affects word association. For example, if you see the word SO_P when hungry, you will read it as "soup," but if you see the same word when feeling dirty, you'll read it as "soap."  Subsequently, those primed words will retain a weaker ability to prime still other words, in a ripple effect.

The impact of priming goes further yet.  For example, subjects who saw words associated with being elderly, such as "gray" or "wrinkle," literally walked more slowly after the ostensible end of an experiment than did people who had seen only words neutral as to age.  All of that happened outside of conscious awareness, that is, outside of their attention.

Similarly, if you hold a pencil in your mouth with the eraser pointing right and the point left, you will have different emotional responses to stimuli than if you hold the pencil in your mouth by pursing your lips around the eraser end.  The first way of holding the pencil forces your face into the shape of a smile, and the second way, into a frown; simply holding our faces in one of those alternate ways primes our emotional responses.

Those are only a few examples, but the impact of priming is pervasive.

You cannot know this from conscious experience, of course, but you must accept the alien idea that your actions and your emotions can be primed by events of which you are not even aware....

There is research showing how priming by money affects us: it makes us more independent and persistent.  It makes us more self-reliant.  It also makes us more selfish.  It makes us less oriented to helping others.  In experiments designed to test the impact of priming by money, primed subjects spontaneously sat further apart.  When the experimenter contrived to clumsily drop a bunch of pencils, money-primed subjects were less likely to help pick them up.  And so forth.

And what constitutes being primed by money?  Priming could consist of putting money-related words in order, as opposed to the control group's money-neutral words.  Priming could consist of seeing toy monopoly money on a nearby table, or it could be a randomly glimpsed screen saver of dollar bills floating in water.  Or simply hearing the word "money."

We could extrapolate from the results that in our society, based as it is on self-interest (that is, life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness), we are very often money-primed.  Kahneman asks the reader to consider the cumulative impact of a society imbued with reminders of money, in contradistinction to that of a society imbued, for example, with reminders of the "Dear Leader," or of respect, or of God.

Kahneman says people react with disbelief when told the results of studies of priming.  Our sense of awareness gives us the impression that we are in charge.  He says it is not the case that we are completely at the mercy of primes that happen to be in our environment at any one time.  On the other hand, for example, if only some people vote differently on a school-related issue because the polling place just happens to be a school rather than a church (or vice versa), it could tip an election.  In Kahneman's words:

The idea you should focus on, however, is that disbelief is not an option.  The results are not made up, nor are they statistical flukes.  You have no choice but to accept that the major conclusion of these studies are true.  More important, you must accept that they are true about you.  If you had been exposed to a screen saver of floating dollar bills, you too would likely have picked up fewer pencils to help a clumsy stranger.  You do not believe that these results apply to you because they correspond to nothing in your subjective experience.  But your subjective experience consists largely of the story that your System 2 tells itself about what is going on.  Priming phenomena arise in System 1, and you have no conscious access to them.

In a similar vein, this June 21, 2013  PBS Newshour story reported on psychological research that showed wealthy people reacting less generously than poorer individuals.  Moreover, people who merely felt richer, after being set up to win at Monopoly, reacted similarly to the rich.  Notably, the experimental effects were mitigated when subjects who were rich or felt rich were then re-primed by being shown pictures of people in need.

The news story also told about how, when the research report appeared in a scientific journal, readers reacted with disbelief.  Many accused the experimenters of "liberal bias" since they were based at the University of California, Berkeley.

Moving on from priming, Kahneman proceeds to explain that, in their beliefs, people confuse familiarity with truth.  People are biased toward their own current beliefs, in that they select evidence that will confirm those beliefs over evidence providing the opportunity to explore and learn.  People will believe a story that fits together coherently over one that is complete, and the less they know, the easier they find it to fit what they do know into a story.  And we routinely confuse plausibility, a characteristic of a good story, with probability, that is, actual likelihood.

And there is much, much more in Kahneman's book showing how events and predispositions rather than rational choice affect what we do.

Another psychological researcher, Michael Grazziano, concludes that even consciousness itself is not some God-given domain from which determinism is excluded and in which free will in our traditional sense reigns (consciousness being the foundation from which Descartes famously proclaimed "I think, therefore I am").  According to Grazziano's interview recounted in the June, 2013 issue of Monitor on Psychology, and in his Huffington Post blog, and apparently in his books, too (which I have yet to read), consciousness is a matter of attention.  In his view, awareness reduces to a sort of evolutionary bookmarking system.

These scientists whom I've mentioned are only a few examples of so many--for example, Jonathan Haidt (The Happiness Hypothesis, 2006, and The Righteous Mind, Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion, 2012) and Steven Pinker (The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature, 2002, and The Better Angels of our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined, 2011).

Just what the findings of cognitive psychology, as well as other scientific findings of the day, say about the ultimate nature of reality is not necessarily a foregone conclusion.   For instance, I've struggled with philosopher Thomas Nagel's book Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False.  He protests against present-day scientific orthodoxy to the extent it claims all of reality can be understood in mechanistic physical terms.  Not all scientists make such claims, though, and, anyway, Nagel argues that scientific findings don't depend upon the correctness of such claims.

I agree that the validity and the impact of the scientific findings are not affected by whether or not the scientists are making so-called reductionist claims (that is, reducing all of human experience to materialistic, evolutionary terms).  As my quote from Daniel Kahneman indicates, the findings are true about us, even if we don't "believe in them" or "agree with them."  Unless we want to be like those people who "don't believe in evolution" or the like, we must consider those results.

The aim of my section on science has been to give the uninitiated a taste of the new findings and to show why they present a problem for free will.  As I think is clear, if what we call "consciousness" is a story we tell ourselves about ourselves that strings together what we have paid attention to, while in the meantime most of our functioning proceeds full-steam ahead without even breaking into awareness, then the realm of free will as we traditionally conceive of it is greatly shrunken.

In fact, we could say science plays havoc with our notion of free will.

It remains to be explored how we might adjust our vision of what free will is, in light of the findings of science, and how rules might figure into that picture.  That's the task of the next (and final) section.

Where Do We Go From Here?
In this section I intend to examine free will in light of the new cognitive science that seems so at odds with it, and also to show in a new light what rules have to do with free will.

How, then, might we begin to talk about free will in view of scientific findings that intrude into its territory?  The answer, but only in part, is to be found in the second part of Kahneman's book title (Thinking, Fast and Slow): slow thinking.  To the extent that we can sometimes inhibit our instantaneous "intuitive" responses in those areas in which we are not experts, in favor of  the more laborious, fact-based "slow" thinking, our minds will be less a mechanism for "jumping to conclusions," as he puts it.  In other words, in many cases, we can make decisions less susceptible to control by extraneous factors to the extent we slow down and "Think!"

Fact-based?  Ah, there's the rub!  Jonathan Haidt (The Righteous Mind) has reported on how rare truly exploratory thinking is--that is, thinking based on seeking the truth.  Most often we indulge in confirmatory thinking--that is, thinking oriented to confirm the correctness of what we already believe.  Only under very limited circumstances can we or will we seek the truth.

One reaction to the new cognitive psychology might be to declare the findings heretical, which is not unheard of in history; think "Galileo."  But it's not time for panic or drastic pronouncements.

Let's think about our predicament.  Let's think about our concept of free will as it now stands.

It's worth considering that, rather than free will's being some Platonic absolute existing in ideal form somewhere in the stratosphere, what we call "free will" may be a human concept--one that human thinkers came up with in the past to avoid the deterministic aspects of their theologies.  Later we had to contend with science as well as theology.  Now we're having to make some sense of yet further scientific developments.

Maybe what our concept of free will needs is adjustment in light of the new scientific findings.

For one thing, as Kahneman's comments and the rest of the preceding discussion of cognitive science suggests, free will encapsulates what "feels" to us to be our situation.  It feels as though we're making free choices.   But all we know is "System 2," which constitutes our conscious awareness--System 2 being that story we tell ourselves about ourselves, while System 1 largely runs the show outside the spotlight of conscious awareness.

To the extent we acknowledge that the story we tell ourselves about ourselves isn't the whole story but only part of it, we can consider the implications of that situation and how they require us to view free will differently.

It is at that point we come back to the fraught territory of rules--even the biblical ones.

Whether or not we believe the bible represents the literal words of God, is it possible at least to consider that the words of scripture represent a pinnacle of humankind's level of understanding and compilation of wisdom in the times in which those words were remembered and recorded?

The critics of rules in the "Hebrew Bible/Old Testament" are many.  Sometimes (as I discussed earlier, in the section on rules) they are Christians who are criticizing their Old Testament relative to their own "more enlightened" Testament (to use the words Stephen King put into the mouth of one of his characters in his novel Under the Dome).  Sometimes the critics are atheists wanting to show up the bible as violent and punitive.  And sometimes, too, the atheists can even be Jews who are steeped in the same culture as those other critics.

While professing a different religion from that of the biblical writers (or no religion), the modern critics of Levitical and other such biblical rules take the words at face value, that is, take the words literally, for the sake of argument.  Those critics all have in common the goal of hoisting the bible on its own petard, so to speak, which requires that they misconstrue it as literal, whether intentionally or not.  By literal, I mean their take on the apparent plain text meaning of the English translation of Leviticus we happen to have before us, without acknowledging that translation equals interpretation, or considering temporal or social contexts, or levels of understanding, or ongoing religious evolution.

If those rules aren't what the modern critics think, then the critics are attacking a straw man.

Imagine that those words partake of the language of promise and threat, as in contracts between ruler and ruled in the Mideast of a millennium and more BCE, because that is the way the people of that area--and not only the Israelites--thought back then.  Imagine that the words employ simple reward-punishment language, not to mention anthropomorphism, because that reflects on the limits and also the evolution of people's understanding, in layer after layer of tradition, from pre-biblical times to the final priestly spin in the seventh or sixth century BCE.

Leviticus is primarily a manual for priests.  While the Israelite way of life had heretofore been all about the land, the 6th century BCE exile and subsequent return, under the auspices of Cyrus and the Persians, tipped the balance away from monarchy toward theocracy.  The priests, being the final redactors, put their stamp on it, so it's largely the priestly feel that we later readers get.  Biblically speaking, theirs was the last layer.

Time has passed.  We are not stuck with those same limitations.  Our understanding has grown. 

Just as we understand that a parent may threaten a child with punishment if that child fails to follow some important safety rule, we also grasp that the parent wants all to go well with that child.  Even if that child--or today's critics--might misunderstand the parent as nothing but threatening or punitive, that's not the point of parental rules.

Nor were biblical rules there to give God an excuse to smite people for breaking rules.  That's a familiar claim one hears from critics.  And, no, the rules are not there so people who break them will go to Hell.  (The concept of Hell hadn't yet been invented when those rules were first rehearsed and then written down.)  Nor did the rules function to help an upper class suppress the people until Jesus arrived to free them from the law.  Those misconceptions serve certain underlying political and theological functions, such as claiming to have "the better way," or smearing religion in general.  Those sorts of misconceptions may take the rules out of their proper context, or they may be anachronistic, erroneously placing back in history current social situations that didn't exist back then.  Whatever, they are polemical readings of the text.

A corollary of that way of reading the text may be that Christians who are intending to confront "Old Testament thinking" by their criticism are also giving aid and succor to atheists.

I've been trying out the notion that the rules are there for people to follow and walk in God's way so that it will go well for them--and for God.  The rules are there to point people in the right direction, and, so that by concentrating on the rules, they will be focused on what would be recognized in biblical understanding as God's will.  The rules are there because we need headlights to see our way.

In terms of today's cognitive science, without such a discipline we are at the mercy of extraneous forces.

The critics seem to misconstrue biblical rules for the sake of criticizing them. Or maybe some of the critics are railing against biblical language, insisting that it should reflect views from the vantage point of today, or should be discarded because it is not better than it is--although those same critics may typically value creativity and freedom of speech and may not ordinarily be in the habit of suppressing other forms of literature or media.

The bible is in the language it is because it was written a very long time ago, and not only that, but because of how it happens to have been translated.

The critics likely have in mind, too, misuses to which they believe it has been put.

We ask again, then: what in the world are the rules for and what good are they?

I have been trying out the idea that they are there for the benefit of the discipline--and the light a discipline can shine on the way ahead.

The same Americans for whom the concept of "rules" is at first blush a negative concept are not averse to discipline, that is, self-discipline, for their children and for themselves.

Likewise, the same Americans for whom "rules" is a negative codeword also tend to admire the "nuns on the bus."  Although I'm speaking primarily of mainline liberal Protestants, not Catholics, they nevertheless often admire the cloistered religious orders in general, particularly if the order's aims are toward greater spirituality or mysticism, or if the brothers or nuns provide care for others at the cost of everyday selfish aims.  For example, not long ago I saw a notice in the paper announcing that "author, retreat leader, and Benedictine Sister Macrina Wiederkehr will talk about 'Finding your Monastic Heart: A Way to God,'" at a local Episcopal church.  What do monastic communities have, if not an order, a rule?  In other words, a discipline.

Then there's mindfulness, which is big nowadays--and what is mindfulness if not a form of discipline?

Yes, but, some people may say, the biblical rules are another story.  My answer is that that  negative perspective is largely in the eyes of the beholder, coming from the polemical habits of thinking about Judaism in Jesus' day with which they have been imbued, or, one might say, indoctrinated.

In the section on science I aimed to show there is no neutral territory; no automatic realm of free will or freedom from influence, either over our decisions or even our perceptions of how the world is.  Freedom may not be "just another word for nothing left to lose," but it's the case that there exists no rule-free, less arduous way to which we have access through a passive abandonment of effort.  No discipline (no rules) is a passive stance that entails giving in to our biological programming and our societal preconceptions: what Hannah Arendt, for example, seemed to believe was the abandonment of thinking--the passivity of falling head over heals into conventional ideology.  The freedom to choose that we do have is the freedom to use a discipline.

Before we can practice a discipline, we have to find a one, and before we can find a discipline, we have to decide where to look.  Choosing where to look means choosing what to open ourselves up to and what to neglect.  The world is full of stimuli.  Not choosing a disciplined approach does not mean the stimuli stop.  If we don't direct our attention according to a discipline, our attention will be directed by opinion makers du jour. Only via a discipline can we have some say in the matter, and therein lies such free will as we have.

Otherwise we're at the mercy of money and power, or whatever is the going ideology, which history tells us can be one that exploits others (for example, slavery) or even worse, even a murderous one.

A discipline requires practice.  What seems confining and unnatural becomes easy and natural, through practice.  Take learning to read, learning to drive, learning to swim, learning to play an instrument, or a sport, or becoming expert in one's field.

In their 1989 book Resident Aliens, Stanley Hauerwas and William H. Willimon exhort Christians not to confuse the Church with the culture at large, but rather to be the Church.  By that, they mean to follow a way separate and distinct from the culture at large.   What they are describing is very close to following a discipline.

Hauerwas and Willimon waffle only at the point of confronting what are to be the rules.  They do enumerate several ethical rules.  Then, though, they talk about trusting Jesus and getting rid of the "false" baggage, by which I'm afraid they may have intended to refer to their conception of Jewish law or the like, and their vision of Jesus as having jettisoned it.  There's mention of sending out an army to convert people in a foreign country--a penetrating army, no less.  Then they go theologically vague.  They talk about the necessity of narrative (stories).  They talk of the virtues of adventure--revolution, communal life, patience, dependability, being linked to a true story--and trusting Jesus to give the rules--which, however, they never seem to get around to enumerating.

I fear that their apparent avoidance provides another example of Christians shying away from words about rules and discipline, because of their theological understanding of what is Christian and what is Jewish, but of course Christians do have rituals other than the ethical--attending church, for example, or taking communion, or serving others.  Christians used to observe their Sabbath although lately that too has seemingly fallen under the rubric of meaningless rules to be eschewed.

To be a people, as Hauerwas and Willimon advocate, living and on the march in the real world, is going to require rules to light the way.  Considering "rules" to be a dirty word is a problem.

I recommend we remember the good advice of the Sunday school guest teacher/seminary professor whom I quoted in the section on Rules: The conflict about rules really was never between Christianity and Judaism.  It was within Christianity.  That is easy to forget with "rules" having been almost institutionalized in the public imagination of many Christians as part of what sets Christianity apart from Judaism.

As a counter example to my criticism of Resident Aliens and to what I have said about Christians and rules, mention is due to a movement with which my husband was involved in his youth and which he has said saved Christianity for him: The Ecumenical Institute, later known as the Institute for Cultural Affairs.  That organization, begun within Methodism and supported by the World Council of Churches, had its heyday in the 1970s.  Its goal was not proselytizing but taking action in the world.  Its backbone was The Order Ecumenical, a covenant entered into by couples.  The organization saw itself as a family order.  It consisted of people following a rule, but out in the world, not in a cloistered setting.  Its strength was not in scriptural orientation, but in Christian liturgy and ritual centered especially around mealtime, with the goal of producing an intentional community.  The organization also conducted educational courses on their methodology, which my husband prevailed on his siblings as well as myself to sample, although none of us was affected at the deep level he was; he has characterized the invigorating and life-changing message of The Ecumenical Institute for him and others as, "Get up; pick up your bed and walk" (John 5:8).  The Order Ecumenical called itself out of existence in 1988, although ICAI lives on as a nonprofit organization.

In the matter of free will, in light of the new cognitive psychology, the fact we must face is that free will requires a discipline.  We need rules to focus attention, that is, to focus conscious awareness.  That focus determines what we pay attention to--what we see and where we go--and that is how it is like headlights. We have to choose our discipline or our choices will be somebody or something else' decision, if not randomly expended energy.  Sheer waste, in other words.  In fact, I'm tempted to use the biblical injunction against "spilling one's seed upon the ground" at this point, in the sense of wasted energy, wasted potential.   Under such a circumstance we cannot be said to be exercising free will except in the sense of abdicating it.

The priestly laws of Leviticus bestowed the freedom to focus on God and live in God's way.
That was the purpose of the rules; in other words, it was the way--halacha.

To summarize the essence of what rules do: If consciousness is attention, and we only see that to which we attend, then the purpose of our discipline is to illuminate our direction, using the spotlight of our consciousness to cut into the darkness, creating as we go.

To recapitulate, the biblical rules never were there to provide the chance for missteps and consequent punishment or as a way for "Jewish leaders" to suppress the people.  Christianity in some of its forms may have made hay with that characterization of rules, but it is a stance that also has backfired, contributing to internal dissension and fragmentation.  Meanwhile, within Judaism, times and rules may have evolved, but a discipline of how to live will always be involved.  The fact remains--no discipline, no freedom.  That is what it means to say the discipline constitutes the God-given laws of life.  Although biblical language is that of reward and punishment and also is God-centric, because that was the language people understood, we don't have to be fundamentalist about our theology.

When we contemplate illuminating not merely our own personal futures but the future of people, no one person and no one culture or tradition can do it alone, because that spotlight requires not just me and not just you, but all of us, so that we can strive, not toward some end that is already written, but creating as we go.  Only in that way we can truly do what Gandhi said: Be the change we want to see in the world.

Postscript
My inspiration for this writing on rules, religion, and free will began with my struggle with the findings of cognitive psychology regarding what consciousness is and regarding what is it that I consider "I." It was the reading of Daniel Kahneman's book that first got me thinking about free will and noticing how the scientific findings he was describing might relate to aspects of Judaism.  All the while I was being confronted with ordinary Christian beliefs and attitudes about Jews and rules, as those beliefs reverberate through society and also as they are expressed by particular individuals as well as in some preaching, too.  All this learning, stimulation, and confrontation from multiple sources and with and by different people became a fertile primeval soup of for the generation of ideas.  At first I thought the subject would be a short and simple one to write about, but it has grown on me.  I have to learn as I go, and have to try to state my ideas descriptively rather than with blame.

For those wanting more, I recommend Nikos Kazantzakis' The Saviors of God.  Here is what looks like a complete version.  It is subtitled Spiritual Exercises and consists largely of rules and story.  Even though it was written around 100 years ago and uses terms like "mankind" and "race" in ways we now consider outdated, I consider it a fantastic illustration of what I've been describing.

Needless to say, hopefully, is that I've been putting ideas and information together according to my own thinking, exploration and struggle, and not based on those of any group or denomination.

Thursday, June 13, 2013

Forgiveness--Questions and Exploration

FORGIVENESS--A continuation of issues raised in my prior post and a denouement of sorts

While I was writing my previous post on blood, vengeance, and justice, I was simultaneously thinking about forgiveness, and it just so happened I was continually running across people talking about forgiveness (not to mention revenge and justice)--in the news, in articles, and theological discussions.

Perhaps needless to say, this post consists of my own thoughts, not those of anyone else or any group or denomination.

Justice and Forgiveness
The first thing I came across was this New York Times article from January, 2013, that had been circulating among mainline liberal churches.  It focuses on what is called restorative (as opposed to retributive) justice.  The article details the case of a 19 year old young man who shot his same-aged girlfriend to death after a marathon argument between them that raged for 38 hours.  It turns out the young couple, who had been together since 10th grade, had an emotional connection that had consisted mainly of arguing and fighting.  Their relationship had become abusive, an unfortunate state of affairs that existed unbeknownst to friends and family and that escalated until it culminated in the shooting.

Afterward, the parents of the girl felt they did not want revenge. They said they believed their daughter wanted them to forgive the murderer.  Within the restorative justice movement, "forgiveness" equals "'complete relinquishment of anger, hatred and the desire for retribution and revenge'."--which may not be inconsistent with justice--or is it?  The parents then angled to get a shorter sentence for the boy, reasoning they did not want his parents to lose a child as they had.  The eventual sentence was twenty years, to be followed by parole.

The families' restorative justice expert, no doubt revealing her own views, characterized these parents as "amazing."  The expert also expressed the belief that "conservatives" would find the choices and the outcome repugnant--by implication belittling such a reaction.  I thought assigning such a reaction to "the other side" constituted a short-circuiting of debate by means of which she projected all possible objections onto "the other" and denied that reasonable people could have legitimate questions or concerns about her formulation.  I thought it was not only possible but easy to see points at which social pressure, self-seduction, emotional manipulation or even emotional avoidance could enter such a process and influence the parties' decisions.  This young man used the girlfriend as an object to change his life situation, not only to escape the hell of the ongoing argument they were having but also to extricate himself from his entire out-of-control life.  He effectively arranged for the structured setting he apparently requires for his own continuing development--that is, he arranged to be stopped, and he paid for that with his girlfriend's life.

Moreover, psychologically speaking, anyone who commits even lesser (but still serious) wrongs within a relationship, for example, drug abuse or infidelity, can only demonstrate his or her purported change and atonement over a period of years, certainly not in days or weeks.  That one has changed cannot be demonstrated by any particular words or emotional display.  Confession notwithstanding, repentance notwithstanding, and no matter how contrite one is or how convincing, the medium of time is the only medium through which to show that change of the required magnitude has taken place.  If it has, the individual who is presented with the same or a similar set of circumstances in which he previously erred will now behave differently.  In couples' pathology the circular pattern of abuse followed by contrition, closeness, and calm, but then, inevitably, by the build-up of tension and the repeat of the pattern, is only too well known.  The substitution here of the girlfriend's parents for the girlfriend in that vicious cycle is no panacea.  I thought that I personally would have been more comfortable with the possibility of parole after twenty years.

The assistant state attorney in the case concluded that agreeing to the twenty-year sentence did not violate his oath of office to members of the community beyond the immediate relatives. That's an issue because a crime is not simply a matter between the immediate parties but also a matter for the entire community, the state attorney being the representative of the state and responsible for "finding justice for" the murdered girl.  As has been in the news in recent months regarding the impact of minimum sentencing, in view of our burgeoning prison population, it is through the discretion of state attorneys that sentences can be manipulated.  While state attorneys cannot change the minimum sentences directly, in effect they can do just that by manipulating the charges.  That's how the young man who killed his girlfriend ended up with twenty years instead of life.

Consider the case we have been looking at in light of the case of Amy Bishop.  She is the neurobiologist who in 2010 committed a mass shooting of her fellow University of Alabama faculty members after having been denied tenure.  It turns out that 24 years before, in 1986, she had shot and killed her brother in what was termed an accident.  Her parents, like the two sets of parents in the murdered-girlfriend case, had lost one child and didn't want to see the second child lost to prison.  Did actions taken in 1986 constitute a cover-up in the name of mercy? That's a question that didn't arise until her more recent shootings.  If so, her case might be considered one in which, unlike that of the young man, justice was entirely short-circuited.  In other words, if she did in fact murder her brother, she got away with it.

Insiders and outsiders
Dwarfing even such considerable questions and concerns is the question of equitability. Even if we think the outcome of the murdered-girlfriend case was a good outcome, how in the world could we apply such a process fairly?  According to a quote in legal scholar Ronald Dworkin's recent obituary, the single most important virtue of the law is integrity, defined as the principle according to which the state treats every member of the community as an equal (my italics).  In fact, equal treatment under the law, one of America's founding principles and one toward which we as a country are still struggling, was the theme of national Law Day for 2013.  If we're more likely to lean toward restorative justice when the accused is "one of us"--as in the above case of the young man who murdered his girlfriend--what about when that's not the case?

In other words, we must avoid the politicization of justice.

Johathan Haidt's 2005 book The Happiness Hypothesis explains the seeming paradox of how religions that teach love can in fact engender violence.  It is precisely the political issue of whom we see as "one of us" that is involved--that is, the fact that we take the teachings of our own group to apply to insiders, not outsiders.

Take for example the following aphorism, which captured my attention when it circulated on Facebook after the 2012 Colorado movie-theater massacre: If a mass murder is committed by a black man, we say he's a thug; if he's a Muslim, we say he's a terrorist--but if he's a white man, we say he's mentally ill--which just goes to show the difficulty of the dominant societal group in looking at itself.  Thus, we seek some other rationale than evil for the perpetrator's actions when that perpetrator is "one of us."  The way it looks is that we are cutting more slack for one of our own.

From a slightly different angle, perhaps it's that we can see the full complement of humanity in a member of the in-group, such that we are willing or able to handle greater complexity in passing judgment.

Because I had been thinking about such issues, I noticed the story of John McNeil, which had been in the news.  According to the Feb. 12, 2013 story in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, back in 2005 he was at odds with his neighbor, who was also the contractor on his home and whom he believed had been taking advantage of him. The two had argued.  On the fateful day, McNeil's son called him and said the contractor had threatened him with a box cutter.  According to the story, when McNeil arrived home, the contractor came into his yard, walking toward him.  He reportedly continued to approach McNeil, who first fired a shot into the ground, then shot the oncoming man.

Although McNeil at first remained free on grounds of self-defense, after 10 months he was arrested, convicted of murder and sentenced to life.  The case turned on a recorded 911 call in which he had told the operator to send the police quickly because he was "getting ready to beat (the contractor's) ass."  His was a case in which the stand-your-ground law that had been spotlighted in the Trayvon Martin case was ignored; pertinent to examples of "them" and "us" in applying justice, John McNeil is a black man, while the man who accosted him and whom he shot was white.  No prosecutor or state attorney reduced the charge for John McNeil.  (In a recent development, after McNeil had served seven years, a judge finally ordered that he be given a new trial or released because of problems with his attorney and jury instruction. His charge has now been reduced in a plea deal to voluntary manslaughter, and the sentence to time served plus parole.  He is a free man once more.)

It's not that "white people" always are the ones deemed to merit more slack and fuller consideration; it's the dominant group.  According to The Law in These Parts, a film that showed at this year's Atlanta Jewish Film Festival, Israeli military judges in the West Bank expressed more doubt about the culpability of Jewish settlers and more certainty about the guilt of Palestinian Arabs.  That is what we would expect if they were considering fellow Jews, but not Palestinians, in all their complexity.

Similarly, a news item from pre-"Arab Awakening" Egypt (circa December, 2010) has stuck with me. The best I can remember, it was against a backdrop of ongoing church burnings and vandalism that the courts had finally handed down a conviction.  A Coptic Christian, understandably feeling vindicated, was quoted as saying that, previously, nothing had been done, for, previously, church burners had been getting off as mentally ill.

A corollary may be that we also can award "plausible deniability" to the harm that results in cases in which the perpetrator is found mentally ill.  "Those church burnings in Egypt?  Meaningless!"  My point is that the dominant group can insist the episodes don't say anything about bias against the Coptic Christian minority, arguing instead that the perpetrators were "mentally ill."  Thus it was that in January, 2011, here in the USA, after Jared Lee Loughner targeted Representative Gabrielle Giffords, who is Jewish, many people who had just been holding forth on the power of words to incite violence were quick to deem the shooting meaningless on the grounds of mental illness.

We need to reconsider such knee-jerk denial.  It could be precisely the most unstable among us who are least able to handle all the diverse societal messages and most likely to act out.

Sometimes, we cut more slack for--and cast a more beneficent eye on--not only insiders but also on our "client groups"--those societal or political groups whom "our side" champions.  Think back to the Troy Davis case. He was a young black man who had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death but whose case had become a cause célèbre for liberals whose claim was that he had been unjustly convicted and sentenced.  Some backers came close to making a saint out of him, on occasion even portraying him with a cross and halo, which was quite at odds with his life before the murder for which he was eventually executed.  The point here is that Troy Davis was not a white liberal but benefited from being made the symbolic representative of a group whom white liberals champion: unjustly criminalized minority--specifically, black--youth.

As the Troy Davis example shows, we are inclined to whitewash those whose cause "belongs" to our side.  Conversely, some of the same backers came near condemnation of the family of the slain police officer (the victim) as bloodthirsty zealots.  In contrast to how we treat our client groups, when our narratives take on a life of their own we can demonize those individuals or groups who are "not us," even to the extent of transforming the victims into perpetrators.

So it is that we elevate those who represent "our side," while those against whom we find ourselves arrayed suffer the opposite fate in our narratives.  We tell ourselves that our opponents are wrong, even evil, and that we therefore rightfully oppose them.

Maybe we have it backwards.  Maybe we demonize them to justify our opposition, our attitudes, and our politics.

In fact it may be that the more uncertain and uneasy we feel about our opposition to particular individuals or groups, the more we have to demonize them.  Maybe it's a rule of thumb: the more we believe we should not hate, the more we must convince ourselves of the evil of our opponent in order to rationalize our own attitudes and actions.  And the more we must point the finger of judgment away from ourselves, training our gaze on "the other."

Accordingly, in my experience, those who are so attracted to the anti-Israel cause, of which Rachel Corrie advocacy is a case in point, appear strikingly pro-vengeance.   Although they are usually pro-peace and pro-forgiveness, not so in the case of Israel.  Forgiveness has not been a hallmark of the Rachel Corrie movement.

At any rate, bandying around concepts like forgiveness, truth, and justice is suspect if they are not applied equitably.  As Ronald Dworkin said, the essence of justice is treating each person equitably under the law.

News items--forgiveness and justice
The word forgiveness appears so often in the news!  Example 1--Back on March 18, the new pope (Francis) was talking about forgiveness less than a week after his election; he said he was inspired by a book about forgiveness and wanted to talk about mercy.  He joked about promoting the book, written by one of his cardinals.  Example 2--In local news from April 11 in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution (AJC), two officials in the state Department of Agriculture resigned after a wild pool party that involved skinny-dipping. Subsequently the Commissioner of Agriculture said, "I believe in forgiveness and redemption for all involved, but I am committed to a department built with integrity and honesty." Example 3--The headline on the April 5 obituary of Ben Purcell Jr., a POW for more than five years during the Vietnam war, said that he had forgiven his captors.  According to his daughter as quoted in the obituary, he saw his captors as soldiers just doing their duty. He eventually returned to Vietnam and could shake hands with his captors.  His daughter, who saw the former U.S. Army colonel's faith as having allowed him to move forward without ill will, said he had given her a lesson in forgiveness.  Example 4--On April 18, after the bombing of the Boston marathon, one of the runners, Matt Sanders (who wasn't hurt), was quoted (Leslie Clark, McClatchey Newspapers): "We can't be vengeful, but to return love for evil," he said.  "People say Boston's tough; we'll overcome it.  We will, but we're not going to set it aside for a while."

Based on those "forgiveness" examples, we can surmise forgiveness is an ideal; the pope talks about it without any hedging; it is the official stance.  We also surmise that for the speakers forgiveness has something to do with letting go of bitterness or ill will.  Yet looking at the quote from the Commissioner of Agriculture about believing in forgiveness and redemption, we could wonder if forgiveness by itself was covering all the bases for him.  In fact, he goes on to add a comment about his additional commitment to "integrity" and "honesty." It's worth listening carefully to the language and thinking about how the word "forgiveness" is actually being used, whether usage goes beyond some "official" stance, and, if so, how it varies from it.

Moving on from forgiveness to justice: I watched the April 18 PBS NewsHour as the FBI spokesperson showed photos of the two Boston Marathon bombing suspects and spoke of bringing the perpetrators "to justice."  On April 4, the AJC described Ira Glass' exposé of a judge said to have meted out "unusually tough justice" and who subsequently resigned in the face of misconduct charges.  (Ira Glass is host of NPR's "This American Life".)  In an April 2 column, The Miami Herald's Leonard Pitts quoted Martin Luther King Jr.'s 1965 refusal to cooperate with "unjust laws."  An April 5 AP story reported a Memphis march to honor the 45th anniversary of  MLK's assassination.  A union member was quoted as saying, "Something lifted off of us when Dr. King came to Memphis.  Before he came, we had a hard time.  When he came, it looked like everything brightened up; a light began to shine out" (thus forestalling acts of violence taken in vengeance).  ...After the recent slaying of a North Texas DA and his wife, the DA office's chief investigator was described in an April 5 AP story as breaking down in tears at the funeral while saying, "We will not stop pursuing justice.  We will not give up the good fight.  We will not stop doing God's work." And in an April 24 AJC story about the dismissal of charges (for selling securities without a license) against the Rev. Wiley Jackson on the basis of his having paid investors back, a district attorney in the case used a turn of phrase that was new to me.  The DA said that the case was being dismissed  because the victims "were made whole;" whereas the victims may not have gotten their money back in a timely way, even if charges had been pressed and a conviction gained. 

So, "justice" gets used to mean the justice system, as in bringing perpetrators to justice.  It is also used to mean "fair," as unjust laws are unfair laws.  Justice can point to something numinous, bright, and shining.  It can be contrasted with vengeance.  It gets used to mean punishment, as in the sense of justice for wrongdoing.  It sometimes gets used to mean repaired, restored, or healed, as in "made whole."

Forgiveness versus vengeance?
While I was on the alert for discussions of forgiveness, Krista Tippett's radio program On Being (previously Speaking of Faith) posted a link to her May 12, 2012 interview of Michael McCullough, a psychologist who specializes in forgiveness as the opposite of  vengeance.  He spoke about the circumstances under which forgiveness gains traction, including such circumstances as cutting slack to people we want to like us, circumstances in which we find value for ourselves in being forgiving, and circumstances in which we feel safe enough to forgive.  For Michael McCullough, the latter circumstance, safety, encompasses factors like the rule of law and the offender's ability to convince us he or she won't commit the offense again.

The circumstances Michael McCullough enumerates do give indirect significance to group factors. Although for him, forgiveness is primarily our reaction to individuals whose positive regard we value and, so, whom we find it worthwhile to forgive, that in itself is connected to our group affiliation.  In other words, we care about the reactions of individuals we see as members of our own group.  That could be exactly why we are willing to extend the hand of forgiveness to them while being less charitable toward outsiders.  So once again we are favoring positive in-group relationships, with outsiders ("the other") being vulnerable to differential and unequal reactions--just as we were discussing previously.  Although in his writing it's possible Michael McCullough addresses the issue of equitability for outsiders, his emphasis in the On Being radio interview was on how individuals react (that is, with vengeance or forgiveness) and the social pressures impacting on those reactions.

On the recorded radio broadcast, Krista commented that forgiveness is strongly associated with Christianity, thus giving her guest an opportunity to respond, but I thought he replied at a tangent, saying only that forgiveness isn't "wimpy."

The impact of legal systems
Here's a striking quotation about bad behavior and the law that I came across. I think it's obliquely related to forgiveness. It's a quote attributed to Tullian Tchividjian, the grandson of Billy Graham, that I found on Goodreads, a book review site:

We make a big mistake when we conclude that the law is the answer to bad behavior. In fact, the law alone stirs up more of such behavior. People get worse, not better, when you lay down the law. To be sure, the Spirit does use both God's law and God's gospel in our sanctification. But the law and the gospel do very different things. 

What an intriguing quotation! That author seems to be using "the law" as Paul sometimes sounds like he's doing in his epistles, but is he also equating the rule of law that we have today to some conception he has of "Jewish law?"   If so, he may be out in left field, that is, if it's not the case that the rule of law makes things worse.  See my previous post, in which I asserted that "Jewish law" is more properly considered rabbinic, not biblical.   And in that prior post, I went so far as to hypothesize that it's human law itself, with scriptural precedent, that constitutes the answer to the problem of vengeance.  Note that Michael McCullough's conclusions, too, from the On Being radio interview, suggest that the rule of law itself enhances the impulse toward forgiveness over that toward vengeance.

This 2011 New York Times profile of another psychologist, Steven Pinker, supports the positive aspects of the rule of law (and contradicts Tullian Tchividjian's claim that law makes things worse):

Steven Pinker was a 15-year-old anarchist. He didn’t think people needed a police force to keep the peace.  Governments caused the very problems they were supposed to solve. Besides, it was 1969, said Dr. Pinker, who is now a 57-year-old psychologist at Harvard. “If you weren’t an anarchist,” he said, “you couldn’t get a date."
At the dinner table, he argued with his parents about human nature. “They said, ‘What would happen if there were no police?’ ” he recalled. “I said: ‘What would we do? Would we rob banks? Of course not. Police make no difference.’ ”
This was in Montreal, “a city that prided itself on civility and low rates of crime,” he said. Then, on Oct. 17, 1969, police officers and firefighters went on strike, and he had a chance to test his first hypothesis about human nature.
“All hell broke loose,” Dr. Pinker recalled. “Within a few hours there was looting. There were riots. There was arson. There were two murders. And this was in the morning that they called the strike.”

So in the above example the purportedly anarchist belief that "Governments caused the very problems they were supposed to solve" sounds very like Tullian Tchividjian's belief  that "law" creates more bad behavior.  But it was what we could call the absence of law, not law itself, that led to worse behavior.

Further, freedom from law may not be what it seems to be, whether we are talking about that common Christian habit of looking on Christianity as the opposite of law (which it is not), or in the modern secular stance of castigating all religion as systems of incomprehensible rules and the opposite of freedom.  In fact modern cognitive science has established that we are always responding to external conditions, all the more so when we are unaware of doing so, and that freedom consists, therefore, not in ignoring discipline but in choosing the discipline via which we respond to the world.

Language and Meaning in Scriptural Interpretation
Aside from pointing to the vicissitudes of the rule of law, the Tchivaidjian and Pinker quotes highlight an issue pertaining to language.  Our scriptures weren't written in English, and were originally concrete--solid and understandable to their communities--not abstractions.  When we expound on them as though they were English abstractions, any elucidation we gain can be at the expense of detachment from the solid ground of both scripture and meaning.

Here is the website of Andrew Daw, a self-identified Christian preacher and defender of the traditional Christian understanding of substitutionary atonement whom I found on the Internet.  He does look at the Hebrew and Greek words in question in the Tanakh (Hebrew Bible) and the second century BCE Greek translation (that is, the Septuagint) and in the New Testament.  He says that several different Greek words meaning atonement appear in the New Testament, and further he claims that those words communicate a sense of "making gracious" or "making happy" a king or deity. From these Greek words and even a stray Latin term or two comes the sense of propitiating an angry God--but that's a sense that wasn't so apparent in the Israelite priestly tradition.  (See my Part IV.)  Andrew Daw further claims that a Christian can't avoid the legitimacy of substitutionary atonement because, according to him, the Hebrew Bible to which Paul and other New Testament writers refer is chock full of substitutionary atonement.

Andrew Daw's connection of forgiveness to atonement goes like this; for the Levitical references, see the link in the above paragraph.

Atonement was made by the blood of animals, farm produce, and money.  Blood atonement became effective through personal identification by placing a hand upon the head of the offering, making it the means of divine forgiveness.  Offerings for sin became sin, consequently Hebrew does not supply an additional word for ‘offering’, the atoning sacrifice is simply called ‘sin.'

But the Ancient Hebrew Research Center site gives this meaning for the Hebrew word kaphar--atonement (which we can see is related to the "kippur" in Yom Kippur, Day of Atonement): "to cover over." That definition suggests that atonement means to cover over with pitch, erase--much as paper covers rock in the childhood game.  The definition places forgiveness in relation to a concrete understanding of atonement, as in painting out--or deleting--the fault.

Moreover, the Tanakh is not a simple code that can be broken.  The references to which Andrew Daw points encompass all sorts of sacrifices--for example, gift as well as sin offerings.  There also are offerings of first fruits and thankfulness, and free-will gifts of tribute or well-being (sometimes translated communion)--often unrelated to sin.  To further complicate the picture, the earlier, pre-priestly tradition was eventually supplanted by the relatively late period, the priestly source being the latest redactor of the Tanakh.  In the priestly sense blood sometimes cleanses/washes away sin--but sin in the sense of accumulated impurities rather than moral violations.  Eventually the substitutionary mode does emerge within priestly thinking but not exactly in the Christian sense, that is, the sacrificial animal doesn't so much die for the gift giver or sinner as much as its blood performs a function.  Also the notion of propitiating an angry God is absent.  That comes along later, during Second Temple (or Greco-Roman) times. The early Rabbis as well as the early Christians did seem to share some angry-deity ideas, but those ideas may be a product of the times and a new way of reading the text that was better suited to the reality of the day.

In general, though, the root of the importance of blood is that blood was thought to hold the life force of a living animal. Animal sacrifice, then, was a way of sacralizing the taking of life as food and rebalancing the world by returning the life to the ground.  Touching the head of one's sacrificial animal did not necessarily mean the animal "became" one's sin, as Andrew Daw thought, but  could be instead a way of transferring ownership of the animal to God so that the sacrifice would be accepted (The Jewish Study Bible).  Acceptance of sacrifice was a big issue in the ancient world.  Think Sophocles' Antigone, in which the evil uncle, King Creon, offends the gods by refusing to let Antigone bury her rebel brother.  Natural law trumps Creon's laws, so his sacrifices to the gods become unacceptable.  In late biblical Judaism, that is, priestly Judaism, where we have sin and the animal's blood substitutes for the person, the issue remains one of repaying the earth for spilled blood (or whatever the sin in question).  There is not the sense of the animal's dying for one's sin in the Christian sense.  Nor is there any angry God, since, in the idealized story as presented, God's commandments are by definition being implemented.

Whether the individual Christian thinker or theologian likes the doctrine of substitutionary atonement and credits the Old Testament, or whether he or she dislikes it and blames the Old Testament, he or she is in that case putting the responsibility for the doctrine squarely on that text, typically Leviticus, and sometimes on Judaism as well.  But it is in the eyes and hearts of the beholder.  There is substitutionary atonement in the Christian Old Testament--when looked for and when read through that Christian theological lens. As no two people wade in the same river, neither do Jews read the same book as Christians--in any case, a living text, not a frozen one.  As an unidentified pro-gay-marriage activist, apparently a priest, said on the March 28, 2013, PBS Nightly News, There are lots of ways of reading scripture!

A Mainstream Christian View of Atonement and Forgiveness
Charles Hefling, writing the cover story for the March 20, 2013 Christian Century, covers some of the same territory about atonement and forgiveness, in this case without reference to languages other than English.  Christian Century identifies the author as former editor-in-chief of the Anglican Theological Review who also has taught systematic theology at Boston College. He is an ordained Episcopalian priest.   His article is "Why the Cross?"  In it he discusses what it means for Christians that Jesus died "for us." 

It is a commonplace that no “orthodox” answer has ever been formally defined. Nor is there consensus....
The word atonement itself is no help. In a way it is part of the problem. On the one hand, we were all taught that it wears its meaning on its face: atonement is at-one-ment, reconciliation....  What is meant by atonement may be either of two things. It can mean being or coming to be at one—the original, etymological sense. It can mean leveling the score, redressing the balance, making reparation or restitution or the like—probably the more usual sense. The two meanings are not unrelated, and the distinction between them is often blurred, but to insist on it is by no means splitting hairs. For one way to sharpen the question at hand would be to ask: Does atonement depend on atonement? Otherwise stated, does reconciliation with God depend on compensating, making amends, paying a price? Is that what the cross is all about?

Going on with his exploration, he reasons: If God's justice demands penalties for sinners, then the price must be paid, so Jesus pays, and human sinners are pardoned.  In that rendition of Christian theology, Jesus' suffering thus results in divine forgiveness for people.  But unlike Andrew Daw, Charles Hefling concludes substitionary atonement does not fit within the bible or make logical sense.  He details the struggle for forgiveness between individuals.  That struggle begins with the decision of one of them not to retaliate, but remains incomplete until the offender reciprocates, with an emphasis on their mutual suffering.

...Forgiveness involves a change in both the forgiver and the forgiven—in their attitudes, their motivations, their selves. Enemies they were; friends they become, or become again. Hostile interaction gives way to concord. Such a reconciling shift in personal relations does not always happen, and when it does it is difficult, painful and costly—but not because suffering is an extrinsic preliminary condition that has to be met before forgiveness can occur, but because willingness to suffer is intrinsic to what forgiveness, in the personal sense, is.
Why so? Because, in the first place, evil is like the good it undoes in that it is infectious. It propagates itself. Suppose, then, that I have injured you. As a person, you are free to choose your response. If you choose to retaliate, you perpetuate the evil by causing a new injury. The choice may be wholly justifiable, but it is no less injurious for that. If instead you choose to hold a grudge, to brood on your injury and cultivate your dudgeon, you will still perpetuate the evil, internally, by diminishing yourself, souring your character and becoming your own victim as well as mine. On the other hand, if you choose to forgive, you are choosing to absorb the infection, as it were; to contain its self-diffusion, to forgo the gratifications of revenge, resentment, self-vindication and righteous indignation. Furthermore, you are choosing to make your willingness known to me, to offer me your friendship, to accord me a status and value no less than yours, all without denying my offense or ceasing to be my victim. At the same time, conversely, until I have chosen to acknowledge you as such, to own the injury, ask for your benevolence and reciprocate your offer, the forgiveness that we must both choose if it is to occur has yet to be fully chosen.

Then, seemingly paradoxically, he says,

Even-handed justice responds to evil only with evil and only to good with good. Forgiveness responds to evil with good by transforming it, by willingly accepting diminishment so as not to prolong it, and by using it as a means of introducing a new good or restoring one that was wrecked.

...Has all this got anything to do with atonement? No. Not in the sense that because Christ accepted his suffering we do not have to suffer. It is the other way around. He accepted it because we do have to. His was a cross that had always been ours, the one way open to us, in a skewed world, for putting a stop to the consequences of our own malice without adding to them. Accepting that way, the way of the cross, was an act of solidarity with us and an offer of solidarity with him—an appeal for us to follow him by willingly taking up whatever crosses the world imposes, by making them occasions for joy, by forgiving.

But this, Charles Hefling continues, is an "exemplarist" or "moral influence" account for which the crucifixion would not have been necessary.  His argument against that, which he considers a sort of heresy, is that the charge fails because humans, he says, can't choose forgiveness by themselves. They have to abandon heroic self-affirmation in favor of being drawn by God's Spirit to the self-emptying example of Jesus accepting the cross.  Hefling is wanting to argue against retributive justice in favor of restorative justice. Punitive justice, he claims, is concerned with what to do about evildoers, while restorative justice is concerned with what to do about evil. In that sense, he says, justice is a divine attribute, and God has submitted to the same justice he requires of his human creatures.  That, says Hefling, is good news.

A View from Judaism
An article by Moshe Halbertal in The Jewish Review of Books, Fall, 2011, gives an illustration that parallels Charles Hefling's rendition of the process of reconciliation between two people--to a point.  Moshe Halbertal is a professor at New York University Law School and Professor of Jewish Thought at Hebrew University of Jerusalem and also is on the Jewish Review of Books editorial staff.  Reviews of his books, which are on religious topics, indicate he also is a philosopher.  His article, "At the Threshold of Forgiveness: A Study of Law and Narrative in the Talmud," cites three parables.

In the first parable, one Talmudic sage of antiquity, R. (Rabbi) Jeremiah, has injured another, R. Abba.  R. Jeremiah is sitting on the doorstep of R. Abba's house, unable to take the next step toward making amends and achieving reconciliation.  While R. Jeremiah is seemingly stuck on the literal threshold of forgiveness, R. Abba's maidservant, who is pouring wastewater out of the window, accidentally splashes some on R. Jeremiah.  At that point, R. Abba, who now realizes that he too must make amends, comes out of the house and face-to-face with R. Jeremiah and says, "Now it is I who must appease you...."  (For the full parable, see the link to the article.)

That first parable shows that even though we are directed to ask for forgiveness when we have offended, we can only do so when an encounter between the offender and the offended party is possible.  If we are stuck on that threshold, out of fear of being rebuffed or perhaps of making things worse, we cannot proceed.  According to Moshe Halbertal, before the offender can ask for forgiveness, the injured party must first offer a partial, preliminary forgiveness lest the distance/space between the two parties be insurmountable.

The second parable simply states that a certain person has injured R. Zera, who then proceeds to put himself repeatedly in the offender's presence--to "invite himself into his presence"--to give the offender an opportunity to ask for forgiveness, which would clear the way for reconciliation.

The Talmud presents that second example as worthy of emulation, according to Moshe Halbertal.  By repeatedly drawing near to the offender, the injured party is extending a preliminary forgiveness that sets the stage for reconciliation.  Even though the offender may not (yet) feel the remorse that would prompt him or her to ask forgiveness, the injured party makes that next step possible.  The preliminary forgiveness is an act of grace, being given without any guarantee that the offender will actually feel remorse or ask for forgiveness; the parable expresses how great is that grace when one can give it--even though it is not until the offender does feel remorse (prompting him or her to seek forgiveness) that full reconciliation can be achieved.

Some Comparison of the Approaches of Christianity and Judaism
Before moving on to the third parable it is worth pausing to compare Charles Hefling's and Moshe Halbertal's conceptions of forgiveness.  I think they are comparable, despite different conceptions of forgiveness in Christianity and Judaism, since both Hefling and Halbertal have described a need for some preliminary move anticipating reconciliation between two individuals.

First, it seems both Hefling and Halbertal think that preliminary forgiveness by an injured party is crucial, although I get that for Hefling that initial step may be less a preliminary step and more nearly the whole of forgiveness.

The second point of comparison between Hefling's and Halbertal's conceptions of forgiveness and reconciliation is a point of contrast. Hefling puts great emphasis on suffering--on the suffering of the offended party in proffering forgiveness rather than returning evil for evil.  I don't see emphasis on suffering in Moshe Halbertal's article.

The third point of comparison also is one of contrast.  Hefling says specifically that the goal for Christians is to deal with evil, not with evildoers.  Halbertal's formulation, while similar to Hefling's in not focusing on evildoers, is people-focused, specifically in his emphasis on their meeting and reconciling.  Of necessity, that includes dealing with people, not with evil in the abstract.

In the Talmud, seeking forgiveness is required and is to be public.  God can forgive offenses against people, but if one has injured another human being, one must make amends directly to him or her--even if the offended party has died, in which case, the moral community stands in for the deceased.  "Atonement for transgressions committed against other people depends not on God but on reconciliation with the injured party." The basis of that formulation is that without reconciliation the whole community would be damaged.

Moshe Halbertal has the following to say about the various approaches to forgiveness:

There are ethical and religious systems in which an encounter, public or otherwise, between the injurer and the injured party is not central to the idea of forgiveness. The Stoic, for instance, grants forgiveness as an expression of autonomy, foregoing what is properly due him. The point is not to restore a relationship but rather to free oneself from one, since the toxic force of a grudge might harm his inner life. In contrast, one who forgives as an act of Christian grace is concerned with the injurer's soul, ideally extending forgiveness in advance of any expressed remorse. The absence of any necessary encounter between injurer and injured makes these models of forgiveness quite different from the one formulated by the Talmud.

Although Halbertal describes Christian forgiveness in different terms than does Hefling, his comments seem on target, as Hefling in "Why the Cross" does say the issue is evil and not the evildoer, even while he is not oblivious to the issue of reconciliation.

Charles Hefling has some harsh criticism of what he calls "pure justice"--that it consists in handing out straight punishment and reward.  Further, since all are sinners, all would be in for punishment.  He says that atonement in Western thought is sometimes considered to be "divine child abuse."  He says he sees some truth in that; it's what he considers retributive justice.  For Hefling, pure justice is all mixed up with punishment, yet my exploration of the ways "justice" is used in our English language does not clearly support such a narrow definition.  Hefling has to go to some lengths, then, to get restorative justice out of the narrow conception of justice he has put forth.  In the process the picture becomes somewhat difficult and abstract, which may be why substitutionary justice, as he says, preaches so well--and why, I think, so many Christians hold on to that belief--that, for them, Christ is taking punishment that otherwise they themselves would be liable for, so that God then forgives them.

Arguably, justice is not limited to the implacable doling out of punishment (or reward).  Remember, from Part IV:

Justice, in Hebrew, is tzedek.   "Justice, justice shall you pursue, that you may thrive and occupy the land...(Deuteronomy 16:20)...." 
Justice, tzedek, is derived from the root zakah--meaning, to be clear, clean, or pure, and, from that, right or just; justified, that is, made just.  The verb, zakah, means to act on someone's behalf; to justify.  Also derived from that root is tzadek, which means "righteous one"--a saint, a righteous person, and tzedakah--including the meanings of both charity and justice....

I don't hear anything in that about doling out punishment or rewards. What about the process of discovering the truth of who did what and under what circumstances?  The idea that atonement means punishment, much less child abuse, seems a narrow definition.

Why the focus on the punishment, rather than on the setting right, the correction?  If my iniquity has bent me out of shape--a sort of scoliosis of the soul--would I look at the physician's prescribing a corrective brace until I'm straightened out as punitive?  What if, instead, it's healing, "making whole?"

Remember, atonement is the English translation of a word that did not originally come to us in English. If I look up atonement in an English dictionary, I will find it does come from an Old English word meaning "at one," "reconciled."  According to Hefling, "...that does seem to have been what the word was invented to mean."  But, again, none of the figures in our various scriptures spoke in English.

In Hebrew, there are several separate words for sin, one of which carries the idea of "straying from the path," another of which implies rebellion, and finally, the most severe, avon, often translated "iniquity," which literally does mean crookedness--in other words, deformed by the sin.  Just as the world--our human community--can be unbalanced and polluted by sin, so is the human being imperfect--leaving it aside for now whether he arrives that way or not (yet another Judeo-Christian debate).

If I were finding it impossible to bear my iniquity, so that I finally repented, that is "turned back" or "returned" to God, then God's correction might bear by analogy some resemblance to that brace for scoliosis.  It would be painful, and pain does involve suffering, but is not necessarily punitive.

We can find plenty of Christian explanations for forgiveness and atonement.  Many of them will naturally be along the lines of how Jesus saves.  Also, many of those explanations will purport to show how Jesus saves by unfortunate contrasts with presumed Jewish theology.  For example, I twice came across Christian explanations that claimed Jews really do believe in original sin although they say they don't.  On the Internet I saw yet another exposition that said Jews could be cleansed of "sin" but only Jesus could deal with "iniquity." The Living the Questions course I took at a church with my husband in 2007 included written material claiming that the Pharisees believed they could perfect themselves alone (without God).

Such theology entails Christian claims of understanding Judaism, another religion, in order to use that purported understanding for the elevation of Christianity in contrast.  As such those claims are also political statements via the dominant narrative.  And they are not uncommon.  Sometimes such claims seem to be the coin of the realm.

For just a moment here, I'm going to return the favor, not with the intent of being anti-Christian but to the extent of turning my gaze back on Christianity.  When I look at Christian theology, it often appears Christians have to emphasize suffering, because Jesus suffered.  Christians have to believe in original sin (and that people are really bad and find it impossible to offer forgiveness or to atone on their own), to make sense of the fact Jesus died.  Christian theology may have to postulate an implacable God of punitive justice, because, otherwise, what happens to Jesus' role in ameliorating God's wrath?

In other words, since Christianity starts with Jesus' death and suffering, Christian theologians experience pressure first and foremost to write that into their theology.  Either suffering is paramount or it's the internal logic of the narrative that "suffers!"

Sooner or later we arrive at the necessity to make sense of our narratives.  That's the way it is for all of us, each and every one.  We (or our predecessors) have an experience in our hearts.  We do our best to hold on to it, to capture it with words and poetry.  Only later must we explain and make sense of it.  Finally to fully flesh out our visions we require an entire worldview.  I elaborated further on that in February 2012.

Christian theology can devolve into anti-Judaism in reaction to the fact that Jews are not Christians.  Therefore they don't accept the internal logic of the Christian story.  Anti-Judaism can and often does lead to Christians blaming Jews for the Christians' own attitudes and behavior toward them.  But ultimately everyone bears responsibility for the realities they create out of their theology and beliefs.

Back to Judaism and the Third Parable
In Moshe Halbertal's third and final parable from the Talmud, the problem is not just that the offending party fears being rebuffed or making things worse.  It may be worse than that.  Maybe the offending party simply doesn't care, or even thinks the injured party deserved the injury.

In this third scenario, the local butcher has injured another one of the ancient Rabbis, here simply known as "Rav."  It is almost Yom Kippur, but the butcher has not repented or even approached Rav, who now announces to his disciple that he will go to the butcher and appease him. Thereupon the apprentice says, "Abba (father) is going to kill a man."  Rav went and stood over the butcher while he worked.  The butcher looked up, and when he saw Rav, he said, "Abba, go; I have nothing to do with you." While he was still killing the animal, a bone shot out, struck the butcher in the neck and killed him.

The third parable may look on the surface like the second one, in which R. Zera put himself within speaking distance of the offender to give him an opening to ask for forgiveness.  The story may even appear to be one of vindication of Rav.  In other words the person who has wronged him pays, and pays the ultimate price, at that.

That isn't what Moshe Halbertal teaches, though.  Rav's act, although superficially resembling the act of grace in the second parable, is one of aggression.  The key to that understanding is in the reaction of the disciple, who could tell something was up.  Rav did cross the literal threshold but also crossed a threshold of time, as well, since it is almost Yom Kippur.  So, one way Rav has erred is that time pressure has affected his judgment.  Moreover, he crossed  the threshold of class, or status, as he is an important rabbi and the butcher a lowly working man.  He has been intrusive, has thrown his weight around. 

That's why we have instructive stories as well as laws.  In the second parable we had an act of grace, but one that cannot be ordered or prescribed because of the ease with it could tinge over to being an act of narcissism, as in this third parable.

These parables are still so very relevant today.  They have something to offer for our polarized times, in which we have elevated the art of confrontation to an art form, yet no matter how well we skewer the opponent of the day, it avails us nothing.  Or, rather, it does seem superficially to give us us much pride and satisfaction, but nothing changes.  We are not reconciled with our opponents; they are not changed, we are not changed.  When the dust settles we are both still there, and so is whatever problem over which we disagree.

According to Moshe Halbertal's rendition there is an alternative to that familiar scenario, or there may be one--we can have a dream.  When we are "the injured party" we can try to offer that preliminary forgiveness, by placing ourselves delicately in the vicinity of the perpetrator.  It's better than withdrawing in a huff with resentment in our hearts.  It's better than lobbing recriminations from a distance.  The risk, though, in crossing the threshold, is, as Halbertal says, that in our narcissism we will pretend to ourselves to be non-demanding, all the while aiming to pressure the offender or show him or her in a bad light.

It's a delicate dance.  It's so hard to see ourselves clearly.  Sometimes the best we can do is try to be more assertive if we are usually too retiring--or vice versa.  We also can try to keep alert to feedback the other party is emitting.
 
The preliminary forgiveness that precedes complete forgiveness and reconciliation may be a difficult and delicate dance that cannot be commanded or legislated, but is nevertheless worth envisioning because it offers some way out of the morass of blame and recrimination from all sides that we have in society today.  Each bit of unresolved personal and group resentment contributes to the morass--a quagmire of unfinished business.

Part of the way forward is realizing no one is perfect or perfectly in the right, not even us when we've been offended.  Remember that first parable in which R. Jeremiah offended R. Abba, but then R. Abba's employee accidentally splashed R. Jeremiah with sewage—so that the offended party is in some small way an offender, too. 

When we, as offended party, try to put ourselves in the presence of our offender we aren’t going to be able to conduct ourselves perfectly because we aren’t perfect, so we ourselves will become, to a slight extent, an offender, too.  That can inform our judgment and mitigate our behavior so that we withhold final judgment or condemnation and conduct ourselves with humility and with the knowledge we lack control of other people and can only play our own part as well as humanly possible.  We can aim for healthy self-assertion—without self-righteousness.

Following Camus, we can say that even when we aren’t guilty, we are responsible.
 
The official aim of Judaism is the reconciliation of two parties, which will then benefit the stability of the entire community.  According to Hefling, at least, the official Christian aim is reduction of evil in the world and the increase of goodness, but Hefling did allow as how complete reconciliation of the parties is also an aim. In his rendition, then, the good of the overall community may also be a value even if not the official goal.

The Christian modus operandi of encouraging complete forgiveness from the start, even without contact between offender and offendee, would benefit the community in the short run, at least, in that it would encourage a certain quietism on the part of offended parties and reduce overt conflict within the community.  It's a way to manage a humongous majority culture whose sheer size might prevent micromanagement.  Difficulties would arise in the absence of true resolutions and if, despite the ideal of forgiveness, many offended parties are left with simmering resentment.

Also, one could foresee a source of inequity.  Powerful parties within the society in question would not accept quietism and would work their wills on the less powerful; it would be those less powerful parties who would be stuck with big consciences--with submissiveness masquerading as an internalized ideal of forgiveness.

A related point is that in this predominantly Christian culture, minority groups themselves could constitute less powerful parties of whom forgiveness is expected.  Meanwhile, the dominant majority may fail to notice that they themselves are not being forgiving--as when Christians judge Jews to be "unforgiving," all the while according to themselves the prerogative of making unforgiving judgments.

The way of forgiveness according to Judaism is more precision-oriented and more geared to a methodology of working on a resolution between particular adversaries--but it, too, has a weakness.  The required process takes place between two members of a close-knit community, so that process is inhibited if individuals are new or on the periphery of the community or for one of a multitude of reasons are not fully integrated into that community

It is because of the difficulties in the forgiveness process across the board--the myriad wild cards not capable of being legislated--that we need the lessons of Moshe Halbertol's Talmudic parables, the third one in particular.  We need some direction on how to proceed when there are impediments.

We need the courage to place ourselves gently in the presence of offending parties.  If we truly are going to increase the chances of the forgiveness process, we need the wisdom to act with grace.

It has been said that "birds sing, human beings talk," so wherever we are, we do speak.  Speech is part of what happens when we place ourselves in the presence of others.  Even though sometimes it seems one's presence is challenging enough, we must do some speaking; we can't afford to silence ourselves.

We must have recourse to speech, but must steer clear of the "us-them" trap such that we are good and the offender is the evil "other."  We also have to escape our "Wizard of Oz" delusion of seeing ourselves as small and weak and the other party as powerful and invulnerable, because that misperception leads to an "anything goes" mentality.  The injurer is not an opponent!

Patience is a virtue.  We must not err gratuitously due to time pressure, as in that third parable.  Over time, community can grow.

When we speak, struggling to confront issues and not people, with humility as our touchstone, that very process can remind us that the offending party has no monopoly on error.  Thus anchored, the injured party is more likely to be able to give the grace of preliminary forgiveness that can set the stage for the offender's remorse and atonement, and, finally, for reconciliation.

May it be so, speedily and in our time, for the sake of heaven and earth.